Given a group composed of N individuals and given a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for each individual in the group, how can these be aggregated to obtain a group von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The implications of a set of axioms, analogous to Arrow's, using individual cardinal utilities--rather than Arrow's ordinal rankings--are investigated. The result is a group cardinal utility function which explicitly requires interpersonal comparison of preference. Suggestions for who should make these comparisons and how they might be done are given.
Introduction
How should a group of individuals choose among a set of alternatives? Certainly there are a host of possible answers here ranging from formal aggregation schemes to informal discussion until a concensus emerges. The general problem--sometimes referred to as the social welfare problem--has drawn much attention from economists, sociologists, political scientists, etc.
The problem is often formalized along the following lines.
A set of N individuals I i = 1,. N must collectively i '
select an alternative a from the set A = {a , j = 1,2,. . . ,MI.
-j -j It is assumed that each individual I can articulate his prei ferences, denoted by Pi. For instance, could be a ranking of the M alternatives, or it could be a preference structure such as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over the set of'possible consequences of the alternatives, or it could be expected utilities associated with the alternatives. The problem is to obtain the group preferences PG given the individual preferences P i = 1,2,.-.,N. Thus, a function i '
f is needed such that
The usual approach has been to put reasonable restrictions on the manner in which the P are combined, and then derive the i implications this places on f. For instance, one such restriction might be if P. = P for all i, then PG = P, the 1 common individual preference.
There are two versions of the problem formalized by (1) which are of interest in this paper. These will be referred to as the benevolent dictator problem and the participatory group problem. In the former case, the aggregation rule, that is the f in (I), is externally imposed by some individual--the benevolent dictator. In the participatory group, the group itself must internally generate the aggregation rule for selecting a best group alternative. The theoretical development is the same for both of these versions of the "social welfare problem," however, the necessary input assessments needed to implement the results must be obtained in different manners.
In Section 2, we briefly summarize aspects of Arrow's [I] work on th.e social welfare problem. His formulation assumed PG and the Pi were rankings of the alternatives. His result is that, in general, there is no f which satisfies five 11 reasonable" assumptions;and, hence, the assumptions are incompatible. Arrow's formulation, since it used rankings, did not incorporate any concepts of strength of preference nor did it attempt to interpersonally compare preferences.
Harsanyi [2] was among the first to investigate assumptions leading to a group von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
More recently, Sen [7] has shown that formulations with the structure of (1) require interpersonal comparison of utility in order to achieve a group preference for all possible sets of individual preferences. There is no individual with the property that whenever he prefers alternative a to+h, the group will also prefer g to b regardless of the other individual's orderings. 
A Cardinal Utility Axiomatization for Certain Alternatives
The specific problem addressed is as follows. For decision purposes, the best group alternative is the one associated with the highest group utility
In terms of (I), the problem is to find a function u suc.h that that is consistent with five axioms:
Assum~tion B1. There are at least two individual members in the group, at least two alternatives, and group utilities are specified for all possible individual member's utilities. to -a using (2) must be bigger than that assigned to -b. Thus condition B4 is satisfied. Assumption B5 is also satisfied by To prove the converse, let us argue by contradiction.
Assume assumptions B1 -B5 are satisfied but that condition Let us examine the formulation implied by assumptions B1 -B5 when the individual's expected utilities, rather than utilities of certain alternatives, are inputs to the utility function u of (2) .
Note that in this case u will also be an G expected utility. We will prove the following strong result. The power of the formulation using expected utilities comes about from the fact that the "balance" of utilities among individuals is assumed to be unimportant. To briefly illustrate let us investigate a problem with two individuals and consider two specific alternatives. Alternative A results in either (ul = 1, u2 = 0) with probability one-half or (ul = 0, u2 = 1) with probability one-half. Alternative B yields either (ul = 1, u2 = 1) or (ul = 0, u2 = 0), each with probability one-half. Note that individual 11, whose utility is measured by u would be indifferent between alternatives 1 '
A and B since they both have the same expected utility. For the same reason, individual I2 would be indifferent. Thus it follows that the group of two must be indifferent if the formulation is accepted. However, note that alternative B might be considered preferable to alternative A because it is "fair" to both individuals. A discussion of such "equity"
considerations, as well as forms of cardinal utility functions which promote equity, are found in Kirkwood [5] and Keeney and Kirkwood [4] .
5.

Interpretation and Assessment of the Group Utility Functions
The assessments necessary to implement the formulation of the last section come from different sources for the two versions--the benevolent dictator and the participatory group--of group decision problems defined at the beginning of the paper. In both cases the cardinal utilities of the alternatives come from the individuals who make up the groups; each individual articulates his own utilities. The more difficult assessments concern obtaining the scaling constants, that is the k's in (4).
In the benevolent dictator model, the benevolent dictator himself must make these judgments, whereas the group as a whole must assess the k's in the participatory group model. Kirkwood [5] discusses an alternative approach for the assessment of the scaling constants.
It is a difficult problem for the decision maker--the benevolent dictator in the benevolent dictator model or the group as a whole in the participatory group model--to make the requisite interpersonal comparisons of utility. An excellent discussion of this issue is found in Harsanyi [3] .
We make no pretense that interpersonal utility comparisons are easy, but they are often implicitly made in group decisions.
When one can formalize this aspect of the process, the group utility functions discussed in this paper do provide a means for integrating these preferences which may be reasonable for some problems.
